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 3 
Introduction 
 
Climate change is the greatest challenge humanity has ever faced, according to UN secretary 
general Ban Ki Moon (Sturmer: 2014). The world, as we know it, has been rapidly changing 
over the last decades. World-wide droughts have been drier and have been lasting longer. The 
icecaps on the North Pool are melting, leading to floods in other parts of the world. All over 
the world climate is changing, due to the rise of global temperature (IPCC: 2014).  
To decide how to deal with climate change on a global level, states came together at the 
‘Earth summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At that conference the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established and signed. This convention 
entailed the framework for all international negotiations on the subject of climate change. In 
other words, within the UNFCCC states negotiate and adopt global agreements and rules on 
everything regarding climate change and its effects (Vihma: 2011, 320). Fundamental to the 
UNFCCC is the so-called ‘common, but differentiated responsibilities’ principle (CBDR). In 
Rio, it was agreed that prime responsibility for global warming lays with the developed states, 
since their industrialization had mostly contributed to climate change. Therefore, the 
developed states were to take the lead and reduce their emission of greenhouse gasses, 
developing states were not asked to cut down their emissions. This way they could focus 
primarily on their development (Williams: 2005).  
However, nowadays the distinction between developed and developing states is not as simple 
to make anymore. Some of the formerly recognized developing states, have witnessed a 
booming economy with a simultaneous immense rise of their CO2 emissions over the past 
two decades. This has led to a difficult situation, because the UNFCCC can only be truly 
effective when the large economies and big emitters are committed to the objective of the 
UNFCCC. More importantly, they need to show the willingness to cut their emissions, 
because without them it would be impossible to limit global warming and to diminish its 
effects.  
This is the reason why all eyes are on China when it concerns climate and the UNFCCC. As 
the second largest economy in the world, China is responsible for the highest emission of 
CO2 in the world. This is no less than 30 percent of the global amount (Boden: 2017). At the 
same time, China has been classified as a developing country within the UNFCCC and one 
could still argue that China is. Its GDP per capita is with 8,481 dollars still well below the 
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average of the industrialized countries, for example (Gong: 2011, 159, Worldbank). This is 
why China has been claiming that it is not internationally bound to cut their emissions. 
However, this does not mean that China is not addressing climate change. China’s domestic 
approach to climate issues has radically changed over the last decades (Lewis: 2007, Gong: 
2011). The Chinese government introduced several national programs to reduce the emission 
of greenhouse gasses (GHG) over the past decades. For example, in 2007 the Chinese 
government implemented for the first time a ‘National climate change program’, which made 
China the first developing state to have a national strategy to fight climate change (Foot: 
2010, 191). More recently, China even became the world largest investor in renewable energy 
(Slezak: 2017). 
Nevertheless, while the consequences of climate change have become more apparent, China’s 
national commitment to climate change is no longer sufficient. Other countries have been 
calling upon China to become a responsible stakeholder by acknowledging its leading role 
within the UNFCCC and in cutting global emissions. Both China’s commitment to the 
international system on climate change and its willingness to consider the interest of the 
greater whole are of vital importance. Especially, because China’s position during UNFCCC 
meetings and thereafter have a great influence on how other states will commit to global 
agreements and reduction targets of greenhouse gasses. All in all, it is clear that altering 
climate change can only be achieved  with the full participation of China (Harris: 2017, 103). 
Over time, China’s commitment to the UNFCCC has changed. The UNFCCC conference in 
Copenhagen in 2009 is generally seen as a failure and China has been accused of being 
mainly responsible for the negative outcome. The summit in Paris in 2015, on the other hand, 
was regarded as a big step forward and China was highly praised for its cooperation and 
commitment. How was that alteration possible?  Moreover, does the UNFCCC summit in 
Paris show that China is accepting its global leading role on climate change and acting as a 
responsible stakeholder regarding climate change issues?  
 
The ambition of this thesis is to find out if China can indeed be identified as a responsible 
stakeholder on climate change issues. To find out if this is the case, this paper will compare 
China’s position and behavior during two conferences of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC 
that have been crucial for the UNFCCC and the global fight against global climate change: 
The COP in Copenhagen of 2009 and the conference in Paris of 2015.  
In order to come to an answer to the aforementioned question, this paper will firstly discuss 
the term Responsible stakeholdership. What is the political and academic background of this 
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concept? Secondly, it will give an overview of the UNFCCC meetings in Copenhagen and 
Paris and China’s behavior during these events. What were the important issues of the 
conferences and how did China influence the outcome? Thirdly, this paper will look what lays 
behind the position and actions of China during the conferences. Where does the Chinese 
view on its role in climate change negotiations come from and what explains the differences 
between the two conferences? Finally, this thesis will end with a conclusion in which the 
answer to the research question will be discussed.  
 
To research this question multiple sources are consulted. Scholarly articles and books have 
been used to lay a foundation for both the theoretical background as in-depth information on 
China, climate change and the UNFCCC negotiations. For more details on the conferences 
and recent developments sources such as newspaper articles, NGO web sites are used. 
Moreover, several parts of speeches given by Chinese political leaders are cited.  
Climate change is a global problem. What happens on one side of the world is influencing the 
other side. China is the largest emitter of GHG and therefore the biggest current contributor to 
global warming. What China decides to do and its willingness to be a responsible stakeholder 
in climate change negotiations, will have an effect on the entire globe. This thesis tries to 
contribute to a better understanding of China and its view on climate change and its 
responsibility. Having a better idea of China’s view could be very helpful in future climate 
change negotiations, lead to more concrete policies and maybe even give a glimpse of what 
the future will hold for the global fight against climate change. 
 
 
 6 
A responsible stakeholder 
 
When the former Deputy secretary of state of the United States, Robbert Zoellick, called upon 
China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system he added fuel to an 
interesting debate already taking place in China. A debate concerned with the question: does 
China need to take up responsibility in the global system? The western world seems to have 
an answer ready to this question. However, as will become clear later on in this paper, for 
China this is a quite a complicated and multi-layered issue. To find out if China is a 
responsible stakeholder on climate change issues, it is necessary to start with finding out what 
the concept responsible stakeholder actually entails.  
 
Zoellick himself defined a responsible stakeholder in his speech as a state that goes beyond its 
own interests. ‘They (responsible stakeholders) recognize that the international system 
sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.’ (Zoellick: 2005). With 
this definition he touches upon three important elements. One, a responsible state does not 
only think about its own interests, but keeps the needs of others in mind. Two, a state and its 
affluence do not stand on their own, but are sustained and embedded in the international 
system. Three, the international system does not naturally come about, but needs maintenance 
of some sort.  
This definition is closely related to the thoughts of the English school on the responsibility of 
great powers.1  The English school agrees with Zoellick that central to a responsible 
stakeholder is the consideration it has towards the needs of others and the effort it makes to 
promote the international order (Bull 1977, 199-200). The English school adds another 
condition to the definition, namely the fact that a responsible stakeholder should be 
recognized both by the actor itself, as by others (Bull: 1977, 196).  
However, the way Zoellick framed and developed the concept responsible stakeholdership in 
in his speech in 2005 is quite problematic. He directly puts the term in the context of an 
international system based on American values, such as liberalism and democracy (Zoellick: 
2005). This link is understandable, since Zoellick is an American and was the US Deputy 
secretary of state at the time. Moreover, after the Second World War, the Americans had 
                                               
1 In IR literature the concept of a Responsible stakeholder is often interchangeably used with 
the term ‘Responsible great powers’ (see Loke) 
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taken the lead in constructing most of the current international system (Lesage: 2015, 3). 
Nevertheless, connecting responsible stakeholdership so closely to the American based 
international system limits the use of the concept severely.  
Resulting from the context introduced by Zoellick, academic scholars have focused their 
research mainly on the question if rising powers (China in particular) can be seen as 
responsible stakeholders on American terms (Patrick: 2010, Etzioni: 2011). This approach to 
the term responsible stakeholdership is limiting for two reasons. One, what is regarded to be 
‘responsible’ is seen as a given. It neglects the fact that other state actors within the same 
international framework can have a different set of criteria to consider a power as a 
responsible stakeholder. Second, it does not take into account that the international order is 
subject to change and that this change can lead to a different notion of what is responsible. 
Therefore, I argue that the concept of responsible stakeholdership should not be viewed as a 
static idea, but needs to be regarded as a socially constructed concept (Loke: 2016, 854).  
What is seen as the proper behavior of a responsible stakeholder does not stand on its own, 
but is according to Cane the outcome of a complex combination of how actors take 
responsibility and how others expect them to hold responsibility (Cane: 2002, 281). This 
interplay is not static, but constructed by projections, expectations and needs of the different 
actors within the international society (Loke: 2016, 854). Furthermore, the outcome of the 
interplay also changes over time, because the expectations projected on actors changes when a 
shift of social, economic and political power occurs within the international system (Smiley 
1992, 13).  
Applying this to the idea of responsible great powers of the English school, the most 
important conditions of being a responsible stakeholder becomes the degree of commitment 
an actor is showing to participate in and take responsibility for the international system (such 
as the UNFCCC), its willingness to consider the interests of participants (in this case other 
states) and if its actions are in line with the expectations of the other actors in the international 
society. This in contrast to seeing responsible stakeholdership as a synonym for the extent to 
which an actor sustains the status quo of the American-based international system, as many 
scholars have argued in the past.  
However, this does not mean that there must always be harmony between the responsible 
stakeholder and the other actors. When responsible stakeholdership is indeed a socially 
constructed concept, as I argue, then struggle and conflict are just as important as generally 
accepted norms to find out how the actors within the international system and society actually 
understand the term responsibility (Bukovansky: 2012, 61–64).   
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Using these conditions, this paper will research if China can be considered to be a responsible 
stakeholder in the context of climate change. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
international society uses the UNFCCC as a system to deal with global climate change. 
Therefore the next section will set out two of the most important events of the UNFCCC in its 
existence and the role China fulfilled in both of them. 
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The negotiations 
Copenhagen 
 
The expectations for the 15th COP to result into a climate deal were very high in Copenhagen 
and around the world (Gupta: 2009, 93). Indeed, the 15th COP in Copenhagen was seen as a 
critical moment in time for the climate negotiations, which was also reflected by the large 
amount of national delegations and heads of state and government present in Copenhagen 
(Christoff: 2011, 637). The Kyoto protocol, the leading international agreement at that 
moment, was expiring in 2012 and Copenhagen was deemed pivotal to ensure a proper 
preparation to its successor. In 2007, the parties had agreed to the Bali Action Plan, in which 
they declared to develop and adopt a global long-term agreement on action against climate 
change for the period after 2012 (Christoff: 2011, 638). This agreement was to be adopted at 
the Conference in Copenhagen and to include, both a global goal for the reduction of GHG 
emissions and concrete commitments on adaption, mitigation, financing and technology 
(Nagtzaam 2010, 216).  
Even though, there was a large consensus that an accord was necessary, there were still a lot 
of issues to sort out. Firstly, there was the question if the Copenhagen accord should be 
legally binding or not. Secondly, the parties had to decide if an increase of 2 or 1,5 degrees 
Celsius would become the accepted limit to the rise of global temperature. Thirdly, they had 
to establish individual state mitigation targets for the short term concerning the developed 
states.   
Fourthly, they had to decide if developing states should also meet legally binding 
commitments. This would have been a substantial change from the Kyoto protocol, in which 
the developing countries were not obliged in any way. Relating to this issue, there was an 
ongoing debate if the commitment of the developing world should be reported, measured and 
verified by the UNFCCC. Lastly, the states had to decide on how to approach the funding of 
developing states for their adaption and mitigation policies (Christoff: 2011).  
Even with so many issues on the table, there was a lot of hope that Copenhagen could lead to 
a meaningful agreement (Carter: 2011, 689). As a matter of fact, just before the conference in 
Copenhagen, the Chinese government introduced her plan to cut 40-45 percent of the Chinese 
emission of carbon by 2020. The Chinese chose this moment to show initiative and the 
Chinese willingness to be an example and to take responsibility (Conrad:2012, 442). This was 
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a bigger commitment than any of the other large emitters had ever shown, revealing a China 
that was willing to be part of a solution to fight climate change (Gong 2011, 171). Moreover, 
on November 18 2009, China and the US declared that they were both committed to an 
accord that would cover all issues during the negotiations and that would have an immediate 
effect.  (Nagtzaam: 2010, 170) However, early in the negotiations it became clear that a 
fruitful consensus was far out of reach.  
By the time the national leaders arrived in Copenhagen it became clear that China was not 
willing to play by the book or to do concessions on their expense. There were several 
occasions on which China made clear that its national interests were of the highest priority 
and that China was very much aware of its power to make or break a deal (Bodansky: 2010, 
240, Carter: 2011, 690). For example, the head of the Chinese negotiating interrupted the 
Danish chair during one of the first meetings, which was interpreted by many as a clear sign 
of questioning the authority of the host (Carter: 2011, 690). Moreover, on several occasions 
the Chinese had sent lower ranking officials in stead of the premier Wen Jiabao. Even to 
meetings where other heads of state were present, such as US President Obama and the 
German chancellor Merkel. The other leaders had to wait for the lower ranking official to go 
back and forth between the meeting and Wen Jiabao , the Chinese Premier (Lynas: 2009, 
Christoff: 2011, 639, Revkin and Broder: 2009).  However, most controversial was the 
meeting China organized with the BASIC countries (a group of large emerging countries 
consisting of Brazil, South- Africa, India and China), while a meeting with the U.S. President 
was planned. When President Obama found out about the other meeting, he rushed down and 
had to knock on the door to see if he could join the conversation. Eventually, the meeting 
continued with President Obama and the state leaders of the BASIC countries, but it was clear 
that China had power-played the meeting (Nagtzaam: 2010, 228, Christoff: 2011, 639, Revkin 
and Broder: 2009).     
China’s undivided focus on its own interests did not only influence its attitude during the 
COP, but also had a great influence on the outcome of the negotiations. Firstly, most of the 
least developed countries in the world had pleaded to keep the rise of the global temperature 
below the 1,5 degrees Celsius (Nagtzaam: 2010, 235). These countries are known to be the 
most vulnerable for the consequences of climate change and were most in need of a radical 
target (IPCCC). However, China was worried that such a low increase of temperature would 
require drastic measures. It feared it would hurt the economic growth too much. Therefore, 
China refused to commit to 1,5 degrees and made sure that a cap of 2 degrees was recorded in 
the actual accord (Nagtzaam: 2010, 235)    
 11 
Secondly, at Copenhagen a consensus had to be reached on individual state targets for the 
developed countries to strive to for the year 2050 (Annex 1 countries). The European Union 
was very much in favor and in an earlier draft the number -80% was mentioned. However, 
China demanded to eliminate an absolute number. This to the frustration of the German 
chancellor Angela Merkel, because China was not even labelled an Annex 1 country. But it 
was clear that China did not want to put any actual effective targets in the accord, afraid that it 
would be forced to fulfill this target too at some point in the future (Lynas: 2009, Parker: 
2012, 284). Even a global target of -50% for 2050 had to be removed on China’s insistence, 
because it would lay too great a burden on developing countries (Christoff: 2011, 639). 
Thirdly, an important point on the agenda was the question if developing states should have  
limitations to their emissions as well. In the Kyoto protocol China was labeled as a 
developing country and during the negotiations in Copenhagen China defended this position 
heavily (Parker: 2012, 278). Moreover, China claimed that under the common, but 
differentiated principle it was only logical that China did not have the same targets as the 
developed world (Conrad: 2012, 447).  On the other side, the developed states lead by the US 
had great problems with China still claiming the rights of a developing country, especially 
because China had become the largest emitter of CO2 in the world (Bodansky: 2010, 236). In 
addition, the developed world wanted the accord to include measures to monitor and verify 
the commitments made by developing countries to keep track of global improvements. China 
eventually agreed that if mitigation or adaptation was possible through funding from 
developed countries, monitoring and verification was in place (Nagtzaam: 2010, 222). 
However, China strongly opposed to any other monitoring and verification by an international 
organ. The Chinese delegation claimed it would be infringement of sovereignty, something 
that China did not want to sacrifice (Scott: 2010, 80,  Revkin and Broder: 2009).  
On the final day of the negotiations a final draft was presented to all participants. A draft 
mostly set up by the US, China and the other major emitters (Christoff: 2011, 639).  This draft 
resulted into the Copenhagen accord, which was solely noted and not adopted, due to a lack of 
consensus. It had no binding or legal power, but was merely a political text. (Christoffer: 
2011, 637). Not the necessary cap of 1,5 degrees Celsius was included, but a maximum rise of 
2 degrees was mentioned in the accord. Just as China had advocated. (Gupta: 2009, 93). The 
accord did not provide any short term targets to reduce the emmissions of the industrialized 
states to stay within the 2 degrees Celsius range. As a matter of fact, no specific targets of 
timetables that could lead to decreasing climate change were included. Like in the Kyoto 
protocol, the emerging developing states still did not have any binding targets. And 
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verification and monitoring within developing countries could only happen under very strict 
rules (Parker: 2012, 283, Gupta: 2009, 93). 
The reactions on the conference and the accord were full of dissolution. The least developed 
countries were very disappointed. They had hoped on more extreme measures to fight climate 
change and for the larger developing countries to defend their interests (Christoff: 2011, 640, 
Gupta: 2009, 97, Conrad, 2012, 442). Also, the European countries and the US reactions were 
full of frustration. Even president Obama, who did have an influential role in the process, said 
that the end result of the COP in Copenhagen was only a modest step forward (Revkin and 
Broder: 2009).  
China, on the other hand, was much more positive. The head of the Chinese delegation, Xie 
Zhenhua, said that both sides were able to defend their bottom line. For China that had been 
the Chinese national interest and their sovereignty (Nagtzaam: 2010, 232). Moreover, China 
was able to achieve most of its pre-set goals. The accord did not entail any binding 
commitments for China, the cap of 2 degrees Celsius was maintained, no specific targets and 
timetables were mentioned and no external monitoring and verification was included (Parker: 
2012, 282). Nevertheless, China did agree that the COP could have been a greater success 
with more substantial agreements. However, China mainly contributed to the disappointing 
outcome and to the unwillingness of the US and the EU to fulfill the pledges made in the 
Kyoto protocol and the Bali action plan, such as sufficient funding for adaptation and 
mitigation and a strict following of ‘the common but differentiated principle‘ for all 
developing countries (including China) (Garnaut: 2010). 
All in all, the COP in Copenhagen left a very confusing image of China’s position towards 
climate change behind. From a Chinese perspective, China came with a great willingness to 
play a constructive part at the negotiations (Gong: 2011, 171, Conrad: 2012). However, to 
most of the outside world COP15 showed a very reluctant and ambiguous China mainly 
responsible for the failure of the Copenhagen accord (Lynas: 2009, Gong: 2011, 172, Scott: 
2010, 79).  
 
Paris 
 
The pressure on the 21st COP in Paris to lead to a successful outcome was very high. 
Copenhagen should have led to a successor of the Kyoto protocol after 2012, but could not 
live up to that task. In 2011, a daunting vacuum on global climate policies was facing the 
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UNFCCC parties. Fortunately, at the 17th COP in Durban the developing states and the EU 
had been able to convince other industrial countries to a second commitment to the Kyoto 
protocol. This way the Kyoto protocol would stay intact until 2020. However, the Kyoto 
protocol was no longer a reasonable agreement for the changing world and the increasing 
amount of Greenhouses gasses that were emitted world-wide. Especially the binary distinction 
between developed and developing states and the great difference in responsibility they had 
under the Kyoto protocol was outdated, at least according to most of the industrialized states 
(Christoff: 2016, 768, Zhang: 2017, 3). On the other hand, China and the developing states 
knew that only an agreement involving the large industrialized countries could lead to an 
actual global approach fighting the effects of climate change. Since the US had never ratified 
the Kyoto protocol and big economies as Canada, Russia and Japan had withdrawn after the 
first commitment period, it was very clear to everyone that the central aim of the summit in 
Paris had to be to create a viable successor of the Kyoto protocol (Christoff: 2016). 
Even though, the aim and the importance of the conference were clear, there were still several 
issues to work out. Firstly, there was the important question what legal form this new 
agreement would have. Should the deal be legally binding? If so, to what extend? The parties 
did not only have to agree on what would be binding, should national policies and 
commitments fall under the agreement for example. They also had to decide on how they 
would enforce the agreement, for example, if there was to be some form of sanctioning 
system (Christoff: 2016, 774). 
Secondly, scientists had shown that an ambitious plan was necessary to protect the world 
from dangerous climate change. The parties had to come to a consensus to strive for at least a 
maximum of a rise of 2 degrees Celsius, even though that goal was becoming more 
unattainable every year (Schreurs: 2016, 219). Or set the standard even higher by aiming for a  
maximum rise of 1.5 degrees. A less ambitious goal would have been devastating for the most 
vulnerable countries (Zhang: 2017, 7,8).  
Thirdly, still pivotal for China and all other developing states was the ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ principle. However, with emerging developing states as China 
contributing such a large and growing amount of emissions each year, the Kyoto 
understanding of the CBDR principle had become untenable. In Paris, all parties had to come 
to a new interpretation of the principle. (Li: 2016, 51) 
Even before the actual summit, China showed commitment to a positive outcome of the Paris 
agreement. Most importantly, by building its relationship with the US. China and the US had 
been negotiating and talking for over a year before the conference in Paris. They both knew 
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that if the two largest economies could reach a consensus, a deal in Paris was much more 
plausible. China’s stand towards the US could not have been different from how China acted 
in Copenhagen, where China initially excluded president Obama of one of the most important 
meetings and had sent lower ranking officers to meetings with US negotiators (Li: 2016, 50). 
Also, during the conference in Paris, the Chinese President had contact with President Obama 
to ensure a positive outcome of the summit (Zhang: 2015, 6). 
This did not mean that every issue was solved. There were still a lot of differences to sort out 
during the COP. For example, on the subject of the binding nature of the agreement. China 
wanted a strong legally binding agreement on the general obligations, but weak on specific 
national policies on climate issues. Moreover, just as in Copenhagen, the Chinese government 
did not want any external verification or review on domestic actions. (Dimitrov: 2016, Zhang: 
2017, 9,10).  
Also the level of ambitious of the agreement remained a point of discussion. According to 
China it was unclear how a maximum of 1,5 degrees Celsius would be achieved, looking at 
the goals set by the industrialized countries to limit their emissions and to help the developing 
countries to mitigate. China found 1,5 unrealistic and kept pressing to include a cap of 2 
degrees in the deal (Christoff: 2016, 776, Zhang: 2017, 7,8).  
Most important to China was the CBDR principle and the financial and technical support that 
the developing world was supposed to receive by the industrialized world. China was 
unwilling to sign any deal, if there was no differentiation in all areas (Vidal Goldenberg 
Taylor: 2015).  Moreover, China insisted on a concrete plan to make sure that the developed 
states were jointly able to provide the set 100 billion dollars annually by 2020 for the adaption 
and mitigation in the developing world (Zhang: 2017, 7, Li: 2016, 51). 
Looking at the initial Chinese stand at the Paris summit, it seems not much had changed from 
Copenhagen. However, nothing could be further from the truth. Whereas China was very  
unwilling to make sacrifices during the conference in Copenhagen, in Paris it showed 
responsibility by choosing to compromise on several important points.  
Opening up the country to external monitoring, is a good example. Even though sovereignty 
is one of the most important subject for the Chinese government, China agreed for the first 
time to include a universal transparency system. This system would check every five years if 
states were achieving their targets. They even established a name-and-shame system (Zhang: 
2017). This all might sound rather minimal. The system does not force countries to set more 
ambitious standards or get them in serious trouble if they don’t fulfill them, but for China and 
the UNFCCC in general this was a huge step (Gupta: 2016, 179, Christoff: 2016). 
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China eventually also agreed to strive for a cap of 1,5 degrees Celsius of the global 
temperature, because it was pivotal for the least developed and most vulnerable states (Gupta: 
2016, 178)  However, maybe more important was the fact that the Paris agreement did 
reevaluate the CBDR principle. The following sentence was put into the agreement: In pursuit 
of the objective of the Convention, and being guided by its principles, including the principle 
of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the 
light of different national circumstances (UNFCCC:Paris agreement, art. 3). By putting in 
the words ‘in the light of different national circumstance’ the door was opened to demand 
from the (emerging) developing countries to take responsibility for their share of the problem 
and solution (Zhang: 2017, 7). Not only was this addition in the text a great concession for 
China, they confirmed it with announcing their first absolute target. China pledged to have its 
emissions peak before the year 2030 (Li: 2016, 50, Christoff: 2016, 772). 
In the end, all sides had to compromise and let go of their deep-rooted believes and 
preferences. This dedication had led to an agreement that was generally seen as a big success. 
Of course, there still was a lot of critique (Harris: 2017, Gupta: 2016, Chin-yee: 2016). 
However, as the Chinese negotiator Xie Zhenhua stated in his plenary speech that the Paris 
agreement might not be ideal, but ‘does not prevent us from marching forward in historic 
steps. The agreement is fair, just, comprehensive and balanced, with legally binding force’. 
(Gupta: 2016, 180, McGrath: 2015) 
China was highly praised for their cooperative attitude and for the leadership it had shown 
during the Paris summit (Li: 2016, 50, Dimitrov: 2016, Hilton and Kerr: 2017). China’s 
behavior really was a difference of night and day compared to the Conference in Copenhagen. 
That begs the question what could make this difference possible? More specifically what lies 
underneath China’s stance on climate negotiations that apparently was able to change over the 
years? And does this make China actually more of a responsible stakeholder on (global) 
climate issues? 
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China’s initial stand on responsibility within 
the UNFCCC 
 
 
To really understand how it was possible for China’s position in Copenhagen and Paris to be 
so different, it is important to take a step back and first look at the development of China’s 
general foreign policy over the last few decades. In 1989, the very influential statesman Deng 
Xiaoping, introduced the ‘taoguang yanghui’ principle that would become the basis for 
Chinese foreign policy (Zhang: 2015, 6, Zhao: 2013). The concept of ‘taoguang yanghui’ is 
often understood as ‘maintain a low profile, hide brightness, not seek leadership, but do some 
things’ (Shambaugh: 2011,18). The principle clearly shows a very careful China concerning 
its position towards other states in the international arena. Moreover, a China very hesitant to 
show an active attitude and to interfere with other states on global issues. However, the 
speedy growth of the Chinese economy has made China more aware of its place in the 
international system (Shambaugh 2013, 43). Therefore, in 2009 the Chinese leaders 
reevaluated the ‘taoguang yanghui’ principle and added the word ‘actively’ to ‘do some 
things’. This very subtle change was to represent the more activist attitude of the Chinese 
government in foreign affairs. (Scott 2010, 74). 
For a long time (and to some degree until today), the ‘taoguang yanghui’ principle also 
marked China’s stance on its role within the UNFCCC. China was not looking for a leading 
role, on the contrary. When it came to climate change, China felt very little responsibility. 
There were several issues that made China very reluctant to consider a more leading role on 
climate change. 
China always stressed that the developed countries are to blame for global warming, so they 
should bear the main costs for fighting climate change. All the while, developing states should 
focus on their development. (Schreurs: 2016, 222). And exactly that development is a 
sensitive issue. Since the economic reforms of 1978, initiated by one of the Communist party 
leaders, Deng Xiaoping, economic growth has been key for China. By becoming a large 
economy, China could become the rich and influential power it aspired to be. Therefore, the 
economy had to be prioritized over environmental issues (Gong: 2011, Wang: 2009, 414). It 
also explains why China has been very suspicious towards the appeal of developed states for 
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China to take on (more) responsibility. It is seen as a trap to pressure China in bearing 
responsibilities that go beyond China’s current capabilities, which will only restrain China in 
its economic development (Zhu: 2010, 42, Morton: 2013, 174).  
In line with the focus on China’s own economic development lays the great importance China 
stresses on sovereignty and self-interest. China had not forgotten its history concerning the 
opium wars, in which China felt defeated and utterly humiliated by the Western countries. 
This had led to a strong feeling in China that China should stand up against the Western 
powers, especially against the U.S. as the current leading western power. This feeling of 
humiliation made China both very sensitive to externally imposed rules, as unwilling to 
commit itself to international obligations regarding climate change, such as verification by an 
external organization. Moreover, it was considered best to stay away from global agreements 
and commitments on climate issues,  because one can never predict what eventually will be in 
the national interest  (Shambaugh 2013, 33, Wang: 2009, 411).  
Another, important reason for China’s hesitance was the fact that China simply did not think 
it could take on a leadership role. It did not consider itself as a major global power, as a 
matter of fact it has always seen itself as a developing country, so it did not feel responsible 
nor ready to act like a developed state or big power (Zhu: 2010, 37, Scott: 2010,81).  
As a result of the self-identification as a developing state, China finds solidarity with other 
developing states important, because of their shared interests, priorities and position of old 
towards the developed world. This is also reflected in the Chinese official foreign policy, 
where the relationship with developing states is prioritized by making it one of the four 
pillars. (Shambaugh: 2011). For climate change negotiations it meant that China defended the 
right of development over environmental solutions and the rejection of binding GHG 
reduction targets for developing countries (Wang: 2006, 413). Of course this has always been 
very beneficial for China, since it could easily be used as an excuse to elude from 
responsibility (Conrad 2012: 441). Nevertheless, the sense of solidarity with developing states 
is a reality in China. As an example, even in 2015 when China had grown into the second 
largest economy in the world, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said the following during 
a conference on development: ‘As the largest developing country, China has the obligation, 
commitment and capabilities to provide impetus for the development of other developing 
countries.’ (Wang: 2015)  
Flowing out of these ideas on climate change and China’s role in the matter, China came up 
with five principles that were presented when China came to the first ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio 
de Janeiro. According to the Chinese delegation, these principles even had to lay the 
 18 
foundation for the UNFCCC. The first, the environment can only be protected effectively 
when development is achieved. Secondly, the industrialized states are responsible for global 
warming and the consequential environmental deterioration. Thirdly, China should not have 
to consider its responsibilities regarding its contribution to global climate change and its 
consequences. Fourthly, the developing countries should be compensated by the industrialized 
for their efforts to adapt and mitigate their emissions. In addition, developed states should 
provide developing states with technological assistance. Fifthly, the sovereign right of states 
to use their natural recourses must be respected (Economy: 2011, 98). 
These principles have guided China’s view on climate change and China’s responsibility for a 
long time and defended a passive role for China. However, did this not mean that China did 
not value the UNFCCC. As a matter of fact, China has been a serious advocate for the 
UNFCCC. Where others, like the U.S, have tried to circumvent the UNFCCC. China has 
always criticized these attempts stressing that the UNFCCC should be the main platform to 
address climate change globally (Gong: 2011, 165). Chinese leadership did not deny climate 
change to be a problem, but for a long time it was not a priority either. 
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Changing circumstances 
 
However, since the first Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro a lot had changed and the initial 
Chinese attitude was no longer viable. Both on an international and national level China’s 
view on its responsibility and role regarding climate change became more and more 
questioned and challenged, forcing China to consider becoming a responsible stakeholdership.  
First of all, since 1992 China had grown to become the biggest emitter of the Greenhouse 
gasses in 2007 and the second largest economy of the world in 2011 (Witthaus: 2012, 56). As 
aforementioned, China always argued that historically the industrialized countries were 
responsible for climate change and therefore developing states were excused from actively 
weighing in on a solution. It had now become a lot more difficult to claim that this argument 
was viable enough to excuse China from an active role in limiting GHG emissions. (Schreurs: 
2016, 222) Especially, the U.S. had become more and more critical towards China’s self-
identification as a developing country. The U.S. even signed a resolution making it clear that 
it would refuse to sign any UNFCCC agreement without the active inclusion of all large 
emitters, most importantly China (Carafa: 2015, 9). Not only Western countries questioned if 
China still should be regarded as a developing state. China in the role of the advocate for the 
developing world became increasingly unconvincing for the other developing countries as 
well. Particularly, because a large part of the developing world is disproportionately suffering 
from the effects of global warming and would be better served if China would also commit to 
reducing its large amount of GHG emissions (Conrad: 2012, 442).   
Even though, these factors on an international level were trying to influence China into 
reevaluating its initial stand on climate change, it were the domestic changes that really made 
it impossible for China to continue its approach from 1992. Firstly, over the years the Chinese 
government became more aware of China’s vulnerability concerning the consequences of 
climate change. In the beginning, Chinese leadership knew very little about how climate 
change would affect China, which also partly explains China’s cautious approach within the 
UNFCCC (Wang:2015). On the one hand, the increase of awareness is caused by the increase 
of scientific knowledge on climate change and the expected effects, both on a national and 
international level.  For example, research of the IPCC, the leading Intergovernmental panel 
on the assessment of climate change, showed that China is very vulnerable for the 
ramifications of climate change. It will, amongst other issues, most likely suffer from an 
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increase of floods, water and food scarcity, loss of agricultural land and extreme droughts 
(IPCC: 2014). The amount of impact of all these issues will differ among regions, but taking 
into account that China has a population of more than 1.3 billion people, it is undeniable that 
a lot of people would suffer. (Hung: 2012, 108) On the other hand, China is at this moment 
already facing the consequences of climate and environmental change caused by its great 
GHG emissions. For example, this summer Northern China is suffering from the worst 
drought on record (Wong: 2017). Not to mention the severe air pollution most Chinese cities 
have been facing for years, forcing people to wear mouth pieces on a daily basis (Albert: 
2016). On multiple occassions the Chinese people have expressed their anger and worry of 
the dangerous air situation by organising demonstrations.  These protests are often 
aggressively put down, but are a clear sign of how bad the situation is and the need for 
change. Also on social media, citizens are expressing the seriousness of the situation and the 
demand for more action (Haas: 2016). 
Secondly, China is facing serious energy insecurity. Right now, China’s economy is still 
relying heavily on coal and other (foreign) fossil fuels. However, that is an unsustainable 
situation considering China’s current recourses and continuing environmental degradation. If 
China wants to protect its growing economic development, it must look for other less 
polluting sources of energy, preferably renewable ones (Wang: 2009, 413, Conrad: 2012, 440)  
Not only are fossil fuels at one point exhausted, the cost of using them is also increasing. For 
example, according to study done by the World Bank and the China State Environmental 
Protection Agency, the health costs resulting from water and air pollution add up to an 
estimated 4.3 percent of China’s GDP. Adding the non-health related effects, the total cost of 
air and water pollution in China rises to 5.8 percent of the GDP each year (World Bank and 
Sepa: 2007). 
China has become more aware that to be able to turn into a low-carbon economy new 
technologies and large investments are needed. Technology that is mainly developed by the 
industrialized countries. An international climate cooperation platform, such as the UNFCCC, 
can provide technological and financial assistance. The need for technological and financial 
aid has turned into a positive incentive for the Chinese government to become more engaged 
in global climate cooperation (Wang: 2009, 410, Gong, 2011, 167). 
Thirdly, the economic growth and increase of national prosperity are closely linked to the 
legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC).  The political stability in China is mostly 
based on the improvement of the living conditions provided by the policies of the CPC. 
However, the improvement of living conditions is no longer merely of economical basis. 
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Clean air, sufficient drinking water and safety from natural disasters have now ended up much 
higher on the priority list of the people of China. The CPC fears that its legitimacy may fade, 
when it is no longer capable to insure these improvements (Schreurs: 2016, 222, Lewis: 2007, 
156). Indeed, worries about the environment and health have increasingly resulted into several 
(sometimes violent) demonstrations directly addressing governmental policies or projects. On 
multiple occassions these demonstration have even led to the cancellation of industrial 
projects by local governments. Showing that the Chinese people are increasingly willing to 
question the acts or position of the CPC, at least at a local level. (Ruwitch: 2012, Hoffman: 
2015). 
Even though, the Chinese government introduced several national programs to reduce GHG 
emissions to both alter climate change and reduce other environmental problems like air and 
water pollution. The national programs would never be sufficient to reduce enough emissions 
to bring a halt to climate change. Already, the Chinese government and local authorities have 
been accused of failing to predict and adequately react to environmental disasters (Hung: 
2012, 110).  
Moreover, because China is now facing serious climate related issues, reducing global 
emissions is also on the Chinese agenda. China’s interests are now partly in the hands of 
others, which obviously influences China’s negotiating position within the UNFCCC 
(Conrad: 2012, 439). 
Lastly, there were growing aspirations within China to be recognized internationally as a 
global superpower. This is quite a break from ‘taoguang yanghui’ principle that calls to hide 
brightness and not seek leadership. Apparently, time and a fast growing economy made China 
ready. (Christoff: 2011, 645, Schreurs: 2016, 222) 
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Analyzing Copenhagen and Paris 
Looking at all of the things that have changed since 1992, one could think that China would 
have reconsidered its responsibility on climate change negotiations drastically by 2009. 
However, at the Copenhagen conference it looked like China stood on a crossroads. The 
‘taoguang yanghui’ principle and China’s initial stand were still very heavily influencing 
China’s ideas on climate change negotiations, but at the same time China was aware that 
times had changed (Conrad: 2012). Like mentioned earlier, China did show the willingness to 
become more responsible by introducing the plan to cut 40-45 percent of the Chinese 
emission of carbon by 2020. Nevertheless, China failed to show responsible stakeholdership 
mainly because of three reasons. 
Even though, climate change and environmental problems had become important issues for 
China by 2009, economic growth was still seen as the number one priority. For China’s 
leadership economic growth was still the only path towards enhanced living conditions, more 
employment and eventually the end of poverty, even when it was increasing climate and 
environmental risks (Hung: 2012, 117,118). Because mere economic growth was so 
prioritized by the Chinese government it was willing to challenge everyone, who would 
jeopardize that. Therefore, for example, the maximum rise of the global temperature could not 
be set on 1,5 and no absolute numbers of reduction could be discussed with China (Carter: 
2011, 690). 
Closely linked to the prioritization of economic growth, was the unwillingness of China to 
agree with binding international agreements. This had several reasons. One, it could interfere 
with the number one priority: economic development (Christoff: 2010, 648). Two, China was 
aware that it needed to change its economic system to provide a sustainable solution for their 
energy insecurity. In the past, the ability of the China’s government to react and adapt quickly 
to problems and changes had made the CPC very successful in securing economic growth. 
This success secured political stability and the position of the CPC. Chinese leadership were 
not at all keen to let go of that flexibility when changing the economic system was deemed so 
important to alter climate change and its consequences. To transform the system would 
require a lot of room for adjusting and failing to change it would in the long run most likely 
be catastrophic, both for climate and the CPC. So there was very little incentive for China to 
bind itself to international commitments (Conrad: 2012, 448). The fact that the industrialized 
countries were very reluctant to even talk about technological assistance for China, did not do 
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any good either (Conrad: 2012 449). Three, among international binding commitments 
discussed in Copenhagen, external verification and measurements were mentioned. For China 
the risk of jeopardizing its sovereignty and possibly facing political humiliation was just too 
high (Zhao: 2013, 35).    
The last reason why China was showing little responsible stakeholdership can be found in the 
identity issues China seemed to be having. On the one hand, China was still claiming to be a 
developing state and advocating the CBDR principle fiercely (Scott: 2010, 97). Nevertheless, 
when a large group of developing countries argued to limit the increase of the global 
temperature to 1,5, because their countries were already suffering heavily from climate 
change, China simply refused. Instead, China formed a block with other emerging economies, 
the BASIC countries (Christoff: 2010 647). Together they had a large influence on and 
defended their rights to economic development without interference from international 
agreements (Carter: 2011, 690). However, at the same time it seemed that China was at least 
partly aware that it could also be considered as a developed country as well, or at least in the 
near future. This became mostly apparent when China blocked the agreement made by the 
industrialized countries on reducing their emissions. It was clear that China saw this as a 
threat (Christoff: 2010, 648, Carter: 2011, 692). In the end, this shifting position in the 
negotiations eventually meant that China avoided taking responsibility, it just took from every 
group what fitted China’s interests best. Not the approach one should expect from a 
responsible stakeholder.  
In Paris, China’s state of mind was vastly different, it seemed like a few very important stars 
finally aligned. First of all, domestic pressure put on Chinese leadership was intensified in 
2015 compared to 2009. Especially, the very dangerous air conditions in many of the Chinese 
cities quality forced the Chinese government to come up with a solution. Moreover, growth of 
the economy was slowing down, depriving the government to use economic growth as a 
valuable argument to defend their policy domestically (Christoff: 2016, 771). 
Secondly and very importantly, since 2011 China focused on what the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping calls a ‘New Normal’ for the Chinese economy (Xi: 2014). It is a new economic 
model leading to a sustainable development. For example, it includes investments in low 
carbon industries, clear targets on carbon use and GHG emissions and measures to encourage 
using renewable energy sources (Zhang:2015). Most importantly, climate and environmental 
sustainability is no longer seen as separate or contrasting to economic growth, but as 
inevitably linked to the economy (Hilton: 2017, 51).   
In Paris it became clear that the ambition and goal of the UNFCCC was now a lot more in line 
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with the (current) Chinese domestic agenda, making way for all sorts of possibilities 
(Christoff: 2016, 771). One of the possibilities was that China could more easily commit to 
binding commitments within the framework of the UNFCCC. Now, the obligations could be 
seen less as a threat to both the economy, as the political legitimacy of the CPC (Hilton: 2017, 
53). Indeed, China committed for the first time to have their emissions peak before 2030. 
China being able to bind itself to international climate commitments also gave the relationship 
with the US got a new chance. For a long time the two worlds biggest emitters were pointing 
toward each other to make the first move, but that changed with the U.S.-China climate 
agreement of 2014. In that agreement the two main contributors to climate change both made 
concrete pledges to reduce their emissions and to be both dedicated to fight climate change 
(Carafa: 2015, Hilton: 2017, 53). 
Not only did China show responsible stakeholdership by agreeing on actually reducing the 
amount of GHG emissions, but the agreement also showed that China, as an initial developing 
country, was willing to step over its initial climate principle to find a global solution. This, in 
return gave a new positive impulse to the Paris negotiations, because it encouraged other large 
emitters to be ambitious as well and to sign the Paris agreement. Most importantly, the U.S. 
no longer had the excuse of doing nothing internationally, because China was not either. 
(Zhang: 2015, 11, Carafa: 2015, 10 ).  
The U.S.-China climate agreement also enabled China to be more of a responsible stakeholder 
in another way. By positioning itself so clearly next to the U.S., China gave the message that 
it was acknowledging its place as the second largest economy in the world. China still 
defended the CBDR principle, but as earlier mentioned, in Paris the parties found a way to 
reinterpret the principle. It seemed that China and other emerging countries accepted their 
new position and responsibility a lot more (Zhang: 2017, 7).   
 
 
 25 
Conclusion 
The UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen and Paris showed a remarkable different approach 
from China. From being a force of obstruction, China became a committed participant. This 
thesis has tried to show from multiple angles what led that transformation. Initially, there 
were a lot of issues holding China back from taking the responsibility on climate change 
issues the world wanted it to take. The fear of not being able to properly develop 
economically and a humiliating past, for example. However, China and the world changed. 
China’s economy grew explosively and climate change was becoming more of an actual 
threat. Yet, in 2009 China struggled in Copenhagen to bring the past, present and future 
together. Fortunately, in Paris China could.  It found a way to view economical growth and 
sustainability no longer as mutually exclusive, making it easier to commit to the ambition of 
the UNFCCC. Moreover, China finally accepted that being the second economy and the 
largest emitter in the world changes China’s position and responsibility.    
China really has shown the world an incredible transformation on climate change 
responsibility. However, does that mean that China can now be regarded as a responsible 
stakeholder? The theoretical framework of this thesis states that an actor can only be a 
responsible stakeholder when it meets three conditions. One, the actor is showing 
commitment to participate in and take responsibility for the international system. Two, the 
willingness to consider the interests of others. Three, its actions must be in line with the 
expectations of the other actors in the international society.  
Are these conditions fulfilled by China during the UNFCCC conference in Paris? Before 
answering that question, it is important to acknowledge that China could do a lot more to 
diminish the rise of the global temperature and therefor alter climate change more 
dramatically. After all, China still is the biggest polluter in the world. However, what China 
did in the build-up to and during the COP in Paris, was of great importance. Firstly, by 
making pledges and actively pursuing consensus leading to the success of the conference, 
China was actively participating and taking responsibility for the system. Secondly, by letting 
go of the principle that being a developing state by definition excludes a country from taking 
responsibility, China responded to wishes and interests of other states and actors. Lastly, the 
reactions after Paris showed that China lived up greatly to the expectations the other actors 
within the UNFCCC had. Yes, there were some critiques, China could have done more. But 
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the response was overwhelmingly positive. By taking on an active role China influenced other 
states to do more than they would have if China was not participating.  
Therefore, looking at the different aspects of a responsible stakeholdership and China’s 
actions in Paris, would argue that China could be considered a responsible stakeholder on 
climate change. Again, at same time there are still many more things China could do to take 
that role more seriously.  
It is clear to see that from 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio to the Paris agreement, China has 
been showing increasing commitment to both climate change and its responsibility to fight it. 
China is more and more becoming a responsible stakeholder. However, taking up leadership 
does not only mean following the rules, but also have the power to set and shape the rules 
(Scott: 2010 ,31). This is especially important to keep in mind, because on June the 1st of 
2017 U.S. president Donald Trump announced that the the United States would withdraw 
from the Paris agreement. The largest economy of the world, the second largest emitter and 
therefore leader on climate issues decided to step out of the deal that is supposed to protect 
the world from major negative change. China was one of the first countries to reaffirm its 
commitment to the Paris agreement (Shuo: 2017). However, as mentioned in the theoretical 
framework, responsible stakeholdership is a socially constructed concept. It is going to be 
very interesting to see if China, the biggest economy and emitter still in the Paris agreement, 
will continue the current course of the UNFCCC without its counterweight the US. Or that it 
might try to steer the system more towards it own values and interests. One thing is certain, 
the coming years will be crucial for China to show the world that it is ready and willing to 
lead in fighting climate change and to grow in the role of a responsible stakeholder on climate 
change, a role the U.S. apparently does not want to fulfill.   
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